A hallway in the Colorado State Capitol
A hallway in the Colorado State Capitol. Photo: Carol M. Highsmith, Library of Congress (public domain).

Modifying or Ending Spousal Maintenance in Colorado: The Rules

Colorado maintenance can be changed only on a substantial and continuing change, ends automatically on death or the recipient's remarriage, and does not end on cohabitation. Retirement and drafting mistakes decide most of the rest.

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· 6 min read · Aaron Herzberg · Support

Maintenance orders are neither as permanent as payors fear nor as easy to change as they hope. C.R.S. § 14-10-122 lets a court modify maintenance only on "changed circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make the terms unfair," and ends the obligation automatically on the death of either party, the end of the term, or the recipient's remarriage or civil union. Everything else, including cohabitation and retirement, is argued case by case.

What the separation agreement says matters as much as the statute, because parties can make maintenance non-modifiable, and the appellate courts are particular about the words. A Colorado Supreme Court case on exactly that is pending.

The "Substantial and Continuing" Standard

The burden is on the party seeking the change, and the Colorado Supreme Court in In re Marriage of Udis (1989) called it a heavy one. The change must be both substantial and continuing, and it must make the existing terms unfair. A bad quarter is not continuing; a raise is not substantial. The court examines every circumstance relevant to an original award, and per In re Marriage of Young (2021) it need not recompute the guideline formula to do so.

The recipient's improved finances are the most litigated and least successful ground. Udis, Connell, and LeBlanc all hold that an increase in the recipient's income does not by itself make the award unfair, and In re Marriage of Weibel (1998) reversed a reduction that penalized a wife for saving and living frugally. The payor's side is more direct: a genuine, involuntary collapse in income can justify a reduction or termination, as in In re Marriage of Dixon (1983) after a job loss. Voluntary underemployment is met with imputed income.

Timing rules cut both ways. A modification reaches only installments accruing after the motion is filed, absent undue hardship or substantial injustice, so a payor who lost his job in March and filed in September has lost six months. And under C.R.S. § 14-10-122(2)(a)(II), maintenance terminates at the end of its term unless a motion to modify is filed before the term expires; a recipient who needs an extension must ask before the last payment.

A hallway in the Colorado State Capitol
A hallway in the Colorado State Capitol. Photo: Carol M. Highsmith, Library of Congress (public domain).

Contractual, Non-Modifiable Maintenance

C.R.S. § 14-10-112(6) allows a decree to "expressly preclude or limit modification" of maintenance if the separation agreement so provides. Under In re Marriage of Rother (1982) and Aldinger (1991) the language must specifically and unequivocally preclude modification; if the agreement is silent, the court keeps jurisdiction. Clear language holds: in In re Marriage of Burke (2001) the court had no authority to reduce contractual maintenance even after the husband's income fell sharply.

The parties can also limit modification rather than bar it, for example by fixing the term while leaving the amount modifiable. A related device is reserved jurisdiction under C.R.S. § 14-10-114(3)(g): if the court states the reason, the ascertainable future event, and a specific time for review, the later review is decided under the original-award standard rather than the modification standard. In re Marriage of Thorstad (2019) shows the trap: the agreement mentioned the husband's retirement but reserved jurisdiction only for the wife's medical condition, so his retirement was judged under the harder § 14-10-122 test.

Death, Remarriage, and Cohabitation

Subsection (2)(a) of the modification statute ends future maintenance on the earlier of the death of either party, the end of the term, "the remarriage of or the establishment of a civil union by the party receiving maintenance," or a court order, "unless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly provided in the decree."

The obligation is personal and dies with the payor under In re Marriage of Piper, which is why C.R.S. § 14-10-114(6) lets the court require life insurance as security. Language that maintenance continues "during her lifetime" does not carry it past the husband's death; In re Marriage of Williams (2017) required a clear statement, in the maintenance section itself, that the obligation survives the payor.

Remarriage is where the drafting cases live. In In re Marriage of Cerrone (2021), the agreement said maintenance was "contractual in nature and shall be non-modifiable for any reason whatsoever by the Court." The wife remarried, and the Court of Appeals held the obligation had ended by operation of law on the wedding day. A non-modification clause is not "talismanic"; to survive remarriage the agreement must say expressly that maintenance continues if the recipient remarries. The husband was entitled to reimbursement of every payment made after the wedding. And because Colorado recognizes common law marriage, a recipient may have remarried without a ceremony.

Moving in with a partner is not remarriage. In re Marriage of Dwyer (1991) held that cohabitation by itself is not grounds to suspend, reduce, or terminate maintenance, because unmarried cohabitants do not take on the reciprocal obligations of marriage. It can still be evidence of a substantial change when a partner is paying the rent, and the parties can agree that it ends maintenance, but the term has to be defined. In In re Marriage of Molloy (1981) a wife who bought a house in joint tenancy with a man, lived on a separate floor, and shared a kitchen was not cohabiting. "Cohabitation with a romantic partner for more than 90 days in any 12-month period, with shared living expenses" gives a court something to apply; the bare word invites a trial.

Retirement of the Payor

The statute addresses retirement directly. Under C.R.S. § 14-10-122(2)(b), a payor whose income drops because of retirement after reaching full retirement age gets a rebuttable presumption that the retirement is in good faith. "Full retirement age" means the age for full Social Security benefits, not early retirement age or the age for maximum delayed benefits. The recipient can rebut it with evidence that the motive was to cut off maintenance, as one wife did in an unpublished 2024 case against a 68-year-old husband who had said he would work to 70.

The presumption is a start, not a finish. Thorstad reversed a termination where the trial court treated the good-faith retirement as conclusive, because the court still has to find a substantial and continuing change that makes the terms unfair, and weigh both parties' needs and abilities. For early retirement, In re Marriage of Swing (2008) lets the court accept a reduced income when the decision was in good faith and objectively reasonable given age, health, and industry practice. In In re Marriage of McClure (2024) the Court of Appeals upheld a reduced award that indirectly required a retired husband living on Social Security to keep paying. The better plan is to address retirement in the agreement, with a step-down at a stated date or a properly worded reservation of jurisdiction.

The Pending Clark Case and How to Draft Around It

In May 2026 the Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari in In re Marriage of Clark. The self-represented parties had written that maintenance "may not be modified or terminated," the wife remarried, and the husband stopped paying. The question is whether C.R.S. § 14-10-122 requires express language about remarriage, as Cerrone held, or whether broad non-termination language can carry maintenance past a remarriage by clear implication, as older cases suggested. As of this writing the case is undecided, and no agreement should depend on the answer.

The drafting fix does not wait for the court. State modifiability and termination separately. If maintenance is meant to survive remarriage, say "shall continue notwithstanding the remarriage or civil union of the recipient"; if it is meant to end, say so, and do the same for the payor's death and for cohabitation. A payor who believes the obligation has ended should file a motion rather than stop paying: being wrong means arrears, interest, and fees, while being right means reimbursement.

Talk to a Denver Divorce Attorney About Modifying Maintenance

Aaron Herzberg is a divorce attorney in Greenwood Village, Colorado, serving Denver and the Front Range, with more than 30 years of trial experience and a practice focused on divorce, custody, and financially complex family law. Most modification fights are decided by language written years earlier and by the date a motion was filed, so retirement, remarriage, and cohabitation belong in the agreement from the start. A first meeting is a paid consultation, not a free call and not a sales pitch.

Read the full guides on DenverDivorce.com: Ending or Reducing Maintenance and Spousal Maintenance in Colorado.

Educational information only, not legal advice. Reading this article does not create an attorney-client relationship.

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